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Abstract Subjective well-being can be measured in different ways, depending on the
conceptual perspective one adopts. Hedonic well-being, emphasising emotions and
evaluation, is often contrasted with eudemonic well-being, stressing self-actualisation
and autonomy. In this paper we investigate the background, structure and compatibility
of empirical measures of hedonic and eudemonic well-being in the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). We use a confirmatory factor approach to
investigate the internal of structure of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ),
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D), Satisfaction with Life
scale (SWLS) and CASP, a measure of quality of life in old age. In a second step, we
examine the higher order structure of well-being using these measures. Next to
highlighting specific issues about the structure of these measures in connection to older
populations, we illustrate that a threefold structure, distinguishing affective, cognitive
and eudemonic aspects of well-being, is more informative than the two dimensional
hedonic and eudemonic well-being that is often propagated.
Keywords Subjective well-being . Confirmatory factor analysis . Measurement
Introduction
Health, as defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO), goes beyond the mere
absence of disease, but includes physical, mental and social well-being. The framework
of healthy and successful ageing (Rowe and Kahn 1997), therefore encompasses
multiple dimensions, spanning both biological and social sciences. A biomedical model
of successful ageing strives for an old age free from disability and disease, with high
levels of cognitive and physical function. The psycho-social approach emphasizes
subjective well-being and psychological resources as the key to a good old age, which
is more in line with lay conceptions (Bowling and Dieppe 2005; Strawbridge et al.
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2002). The diagnosis of disease and measurement of physical and cognitive function is
relatively standardized, objective and structured as it is mainly assessed by health
professionals. Measurement of subjective well-being is less straightforward, and forms
the base of a quite complex and substantial debate on what exactly the good life entails:
the pursuit of happiness and adaptation to the ever changing circumstances of life, or
the fulfilment of human potential (Deci and Ryan 2006).
This paper aims to support research on the psycho-social dimension of successful
ageing, and serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it provides a critical overview of the
theoretical and technical adequacy of existing survey measures of subjective well-
being for the elderly. Established measures of depressive symptoms, mental health,
satisfaction with life and quality of life are investigated in the framework of subjective
well-being in later life. Secondly, it explores to what extent these specific measures can
be combined, so a grounded evaluation of the similarity or dissimilarity of these
particular aspects of subjective well-being in later life can be made. This analysis will
make use of wave three of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) in a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) framework. In the first step of our analysis, each
measure is examined separately and in detail, whereas in the second step all measures
are examined together in a second order framework. In the conclusions, the relevance
of a multidimensional approach to well-being for older adults is evaluated in the light of
competing claims on the nature of well-being.
Two Approaches to Subjective Well-Being
In this first part, the survey measures that form the heart of this paper are introduced by
highlighting conceptual origins, measurement aspects and issues relating to later life.
All measures are situated in relation to the two dominant research traditions in
subjective well-being: hedonic and eudemonic well-being (Deci and Ryan 2006;
Delle Fave et al. 2010; Waterman 2007).
The foundation of the enduring philosophical argument between these different
conceptualisations of the good life is often attributed to classical Greek philosophy,
but remains salient in our times (Henderson and Knight 2012; Kashdan et al. 2008;
Waterman 2008). Hedonic well-being has less to do with the pure pleasure seeking
associated with the Cyrenaic school, but more with finding a positive balance by
seeking modest pleasure while avoiding pain, as Epicurus preached (Waterman
1993). The idea of balancing out pleasure and pain, to have a measurable quantity of
well-being that could help us decide if an action is good or not, lies at the heart of
Bentham’s idea of the hedonistic calculus of utility, the foundational concept of
economics. Currently, the hedonic conception of well-being is embraced by economists
who investigate the effect of economic growth (Easterlin 1974), and psychologists who
highlight the role of expectations in satisfaction (Kahneman et al. 2006), and as such
has been picked up by policy makers on different levels (Beaumont 2011; OECD 2011;
Stiglitz et al. 2009). Hedonic well-being is sometimes equated with subjective well-
being altogether, thanks to the clear structuring of the theoretical framework by
psychologist Ed Diener (Diener et al. 1999; Diener 1984). Eudemonia, best translated
as human flourishing, is often traced back to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, where it
is positioned against mere physical, animal-like enjoyment as the base for a good,
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virtuous life (Deci and Ryan 2006; Ryff et al. 2004; Ryff 1989). The idea that fulfilment
of one’s potential in the form of self-actualisation is the summit of personal develop-
ment is reflected in the fact that it is the highest need in Maslow’s need hierarchy
(Maslow 1968). More recently, the positive psychology movement (Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi 2000) take this striving for human flourishing as its point for
departure. Eudemonic well-being is sometimes labelled psychological well-being, to
clearly distinguish it from Diener’s subjective well-being (Ryff and Keyes 1995; Ryff
and Singer 1998).
Hedonic Well-Being
The hedonic view on well-being assumes that through maximizing pleasurable expe-
riences, and minimizing suffering, the highest levels of well-being can be achieved.
This emphasis on pleasure and stimulation entails not only bodily or physical pleasures,
but allows any pursuit of goals or valued outcomes to lead to happiness. Both cognitive
and affective aspects of well-being can be identified within this approach (Diener 1984)
(Fig. 1). A high level of well-being in the hedonic approach consists of a high life
satisfaction, the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect (Diener
1984). Well-being resides within the individual (Campbell et al. 1976), and therefore
does not include reference to objective realities of life, such as health, income, social
relations or functioning.
The affective aspect of hedonic well-being consists of moods and emotions, both
positive and negative. Positive and negative affect each form a separate domain, and are
not just opposites (Watson et al. 1988). Positive affect (PA) is a state wherein an
individual feels enthusiastic, active and alert. High PA means high energy, full con-
centration and pleasurable engagement, while low PA encompasses sadness and
lethargy. Negative affect (NA) generally captures subjective distress and unpleasant
mood states, such as anger, disgust, guilt, fear and nervousness. Low (NA) on the other
hand encompasses calmness and serenity. Both positive and negative affect are usually
measured by letting the respondent assess the prevalence of a number of emotional
states in the last month (Watson et al. 1988). The affective approach to well-being urges
us to see mental health not only in connection to disorders but equally as a path to
flourishing (Bradburn 1969). This brings its measurement very close to assessing
mental health. Therefore it is not surprising that depressive symptoms are sometimes
Fig. 1 Schematic representation
of measures of hedonic
well-being
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used as a measure of NA (Demakakos et al. 2010). Although a depressive episode is
not characterised by depressive mood alone, an enduring low mood is its key feature.
NA encompasses many more emotions than only depressed mood, but in connection to
subjective well-being depressed mood is the most pertinent negative affective state. The
prevalence of depressive symptoms is commonly assessed by the Centre for
Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff 1977). A second measure
for mental health, the 12 item version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ)
(Goldberg 1988) can be seen in the light of affective measures as well. The main
difference between both measures is that GHQ is explicitly meant to capture minor
depressive episodes, while CES-D is aimed at detecting major depressive episodes.
Some attention is needed when using these measures of emotional health in older
populations, for two reasons. Firstly, some studies report more somatic symptoms than
emotional moods of depression by older adults (King and Markus 2000). As depression
is not a monolithic disease, but an emotional disorder accompanied by physiological
symptoms, it can be difficult to distinguish it from conditions in later life that trigger
similar symptoms, such as chronic illness or cognitive impairment (Lebowitz et al.
1997). Secondly, major depression is less prevalent among the elderly (2 %), while
minor depression (15 %) is relatively common, and closely interrelated with stressful
life events in later life and vascular risk factors (Beekman and Deeg 1995; Van den
Berg et al. 2001). Together, these findings have led to the challenged idea that
depression manifests itself in a different way among older adults, as a phenomenon
called later life depression (Alexopoulos 2005; Lebowitz et al. 1997). In addressing
these issues, it is helpful to make a distinction between somatic and mood aspects of
depression on one hand, and to look at depression as a continuum rather than using a
threshold of a number of symptoms to determine who is depressed and who isn’t.
The cognitive component of hedonic well-being, often referred to as life satisfaction,
is a judgemental process in which individuals asses the quality of their life based on their
own set of criteria (Pavot and Diener 1993). In contrast to domain specific evaluations of
satisfaction (Campbell et al. 1976) an idiosyncratic set of standards and weights is taken
into account. This allows comparing satisfaction with life over groups of people with
different aspirations in life. The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener et al.
1985; Pavot and Diener 1993) consists of 5 items to be rated on a response scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), inviting respondents to make a global
evaluation of their life. From a methodological perspective, it is surprising that all the
items are worded in a positive way, because this way the scale could suffer from extreme
responses and acquiescence bias. Often, at least one item is worded in a negative sense,
to avoid respondents answering without really thinking about the question asked.
Perceptions about the self and one’s own life tend to be too positive and optimistic
(Kahneman and Thaler 2006; Taylor and Brown 1988), so that hedonic well-being
ultimately depends on how high or low one sets his goals. This judgemental relativity
can be seen as a major problem in relation to ageing, as changes in life satisfaction
could well reflect hidden changes in the goals one sets, or one’s reference group.
Similarly, adaptation plays a main role in the cognitive process of accepting the
circumstances as they are and moving to a normal level of well-being. A second severe
criticism on well-being as maximizing pleasure, is that negative events, such as losing a
spouse, or diminishing physical health have an important role in providing insight
about one-self, or growing as a person (Ryff and Singer 1998).
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Eudemonic Well-Being
A second approach starts from a different concept of well-being. The good life is not
just about pleasure and happiness, but involves developing one-self and realizing one’s
potential (Ryff and Keyes 1995). Eudemonic well-being reflects positive functioning
and personal expressiveness, aspects of life that have been gaining in importance in late
modernity (Giddens 1991; Inglehart 1997). As the concept of positive functioning is
less strictly defined than the evaluational, balancing hedonic approach, several different
measurement instruments were developed alongside each other. Ryan and Deci (2000)
conceptualize it in their self-determination theory (SDT) and see autonomy, compe-
tence and relatedness as three basic necessities for personal growth, integrity and well-
being. By looking at six distinct aspects of actualisation (autonomy, personal growth,
self-acceptance, life purpose, mastery and positive relatedness), Ryff and Keyes (1995)
measure psychological well-being (PWB), which they see separate from subjective
well-being. In the framework of studies on later life, a measure specifically targeted to
measure quality of life for older populations has been developed (Hyde et al. 2003).
Four constructs, namely Control, Autonomy, Self-realization and Pleasure (CASP)
together can be seen as an accurate measure of positive functioning, and subjective
quality of life in later life. An explicit aim of this measure was to distinguish quality of
life from its drivers such as health (Hyde et al. 2003). Therefore it is quite surprising to
see explicit references to the respondents’ age and health, in some items from the scale.
Comparing the dimensionality of different conceptualisations of eudemonic well-
being, it becomes clear that in large lines they rely on very similar concepts (see
Table 1). All three approaches depart from the idea that human flourishing depends on
the satisfaction of certain psychological needs. Autonomy is a need that is present
explicitly in PWB, SDT and CASP. Both control in CASP, and environmental mastery
in PWB can be seen as closely related concepts, relating to autonomy. The second key
aspect of eudemonic well-being is developing one-self, and is captured as personal
growth in PWB, as competence in SDT and self-realisation in CASP. The largest
difference between the three approaches is that both PWB and SDT do not see pleasure,
or any other aspect of Diener’s hedonic concepts as an explicit psychological need
(Diener et al. 1998; Ryff and Singer 1998), while CASP does. While Ryff and Singer
(1998) downplay the importance of hedonic well-being altogether, Ryan and Deci
(2001) see it as a consequence of the fulfilment of needs that goes hand in hand with
eudemonic well-being. Secondly, relatedness, or having warm and positive social
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relations, is seen as an essential need for psychological well-being, while it is not
explicitly defined in the CASP scale.
Data and Methods
We will make use of the information contained in wave three (2006) of ELSA1. While
ELSA is set up as a longitudinal study, specific efforts are taken to ensure that each
wave is representative of community residing inhabitants of England aged 50 or more
(Marmot et al. 2011; Scholes et al. 2009). Most well-being measures are included in the
drop-off questionnaire, to increase reliability of these sensitive personal questions, and
reduce social desirability in answering. Therefore the analysis is limited to respondents
who answered the self-completion questionnaire, in total 8244 respondents (or 84.4 %
of the total sample). Wave three is used because all measures were present in that wave
simultaneously. Exact item wording, item response and answering categories of each
measure can be found in the Appendix.
The structure of the scales is examined using factor analysis. Two main forms of
factor analysis can be distinguished: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirma-
tory factor analysis (CFA). EFA is more data-driven, and is often used in scale
development, when there is little underlying theory on how items should load on a
factor, or how many factors are present. CFA is used to test and confirm theoretical
hypotheses on scale structure, as is the case in this paper. An ideal scale structure in the
first place consists of high factor loadings across the items that define it. A second,
connected issue is the number of factors, or sub dimensions that exist in a scale. In
EFA, the data provides the number of dimensions asked and it’s up to the researcher to
determine the threshold. The extensive use of EFA has been criticized, as it assumes
that variables are measured without any form of systemic measurement error (Brown
2006). A false number of factors can surface if these method effects are not taken into
account (Brown 2003; Chen et al. 2010; DiStefano and Motl 2009; Hankins 2008; Van
de Velde et al. 2010; Wood et al. 2010).
One important aspect to help us decide which model fits better is the test statistics
and their thresholds. A number of different fit indexes situate the model on a continuum
of good to bad model fit, but as opinions differ on their cut-off points, they should be
seen in combination rather than isolated, and as guidelines more than absolutes (Ariely
and Davidov 2011; Bollen 1989; Hu and Bentler 1999; Meredith 1993). Absolute fit
indexes, such as the root means square error of approximation (RMSEA), assesses how
good an a priori model reproduces the sample data by comparing it the an ideal best
fitting model, while incremental fit indexes, such as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), compare the target model with a more restricted baseline
model as well as an ideal best fitting model. Generally accepted cut-off points for
RMSEA are 0.06 or lower for excellent fit, and 0.08 or lower for decent fit, and higher
1 The data were made available through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). ELSAwas developed by a team of
researchers based at the National Centre for Social Research, University College London and the Institute for
Fiscal Studies. The data were collected by the National Centre for Social Research. The funding is provided by
the National Institute of Aging in the United States, and a consortium of UK government departments co-
ordinated by the Office for National Statistics. The developers and funders of ELSA and the Archive do not
bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
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than 0.90 or higher than 0.95 for CFI and TLI (Hu and Bentler 1999). Modification
indexes can help us detect which parts of the model are problematic in case fit models
do not fit the data very well. All analysis is conducted in Mplus (Muthén and Muthén
2010), using WLSMV estimation as our items are categorical in nature.
Analysis
This paper analyses two aspects of the measurement of well-being. In a first step the
structure for several aspects of subjective well-being, reflected in different scales is
investigated. While some scales were specifically designed for an older population
(CASP), other measures (SWLS, CES-D, GHQ) are designed for the general popula-
tion. Therefore it is important to look at the structure of these scales specifically for an
older population, and to investigate if they function in the same way as they do in the
general population. In a second step, a second-order model of well-being is constructed,
to see how the different sub-dimensions relate to each other. Can two main dimensions
of subjective well-being, a eudemonic and a hedonic form of well-being be distin-
guished, or is a different conceptual framework more suited when investigating well-
being in later life?
Assessing Measurement
Understanding the differences between the model specifications is key to grasping how
confirmatory factor analysis is used to test theoretical models, therefore a schematic
representation of different model specifications is shown below, using the example of
the 19 item CASP scale (Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). The baseline model (Fig. 2) assumes all
Fig. 2 1 factor model for CASP
19
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items load onto the same single factor. Each item is associated with an item-specific
error term, which represents the variation that is not accounted for by the latent factor,
in this case the CASP scale. Items posed in a negative manner can provoke different
answers of a respondent, not due to the substantive matter but rather to the fact that the
item is worded negatively (Marsh 1996). Asking someone ‘how often are you unhap-
py’ is not simply the inverse of ‘how often are you happy’. To account for the possible
measurement bias introduced by this inverse item wording, two possible specifications
are used interchangeably in the literature. A first option is to allow correlations between
Fig. 3 1 factor model for CASP
19 with error correlations
Fig. 4 1 factor model for CASP
19 with method factor for
negatively worded items
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the error terms of the items that are phrased negatively (Fig. 3). A second, more
restricting option, is to specify a latent ‘method’ factor onto which these items load,
next to their loading onto the substantive factor (Fig. 4). If less than three items are
phrased negatively, only error correlations are possible since a factor needs at least three
items to be identified. As the dimensionality of CASP is also a point of interest,
different specifications are tested. A division between eudemonic and hedonic aspects
of well-being can be expected following the literature, so a two factor solution, isolating
pleasure from control, autonomy, and self-actualisation, should also be tested (Fig. 5).
The best fitting model for CASP in other studies (Vanhoutte 2012; Wiggins et al. 2008),
distinguishing three dimensions, is also specified (Fig. 6). Multidimensional models
can equally be specified with a method factor or error correlations.
Fig. 5 2 factor model for
CASP 19
Fig. 6 3 factor model for
CASP 19
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CASP
The CASP scale, in its original form is composed of 19 items, but revised forms of 12
items (Wiggins et al. 2008) and 15 items (Vanhoutte 2012) have been proposed for use.
CASP is present in the self-completion questionnaire in its 19 item form. As often
individual items are not mentioned when using a scale, it is relevant to investigate the
structure of the latent concept in all versions of the scale. In the original study that
tested the qualities of the CASP scale, a four dimensional structure was proposed for
the 19 item scale, and both a two dimensional (Sexton et al. 2013) and three dimen-
sional structure have been proposed for both the 12 and 15 item version (Vanhoutte
2012; Wiggins et al. 2008). Table 2 illustrates the results for these different configura-
tions of the 15 item version of the CASP scale.
In the best fitting solution, with three factors, each dimension is measured by 5
items, and error correlations are allowed between negatively phrased items. It is also
clear that the negative item wording has an effect on the model, and as such should be
taken into account.
CES-D
The original CES-D scale (Radloff 1977) comprises 20 items, but shorter versions are
frequently used and have shown to be equivalent (Kohout et al. 1993). In ELSA an 8
item version is used. When looking at the CES-D scale in its extended form with EFA,
four sub-dimensions surface: positive affect, depressed affect, somatic complaints and
interpersonal problems (Kohout et al. 1993; Radloff 1977; Ross and Mirowsky 1984).
In the 8 item version only two subscales surface, one that captures mood symptoms and
one that refers to somatic aspects of depression (Van de Velde et al. 2010; Wallace et al.
2000). Testing the scale in a CFA framework, it has also been established that the
CES-D scale represents a continuum rather than forming separate factors for positively
and negatively worded items, if correlations between negatively worded items are
allowed (Wood et al. 2010).
All fit statistics, both for one or two factors, are acceptable (see Table 3). It is clear
that allowing error correlations between negatively worded items significantly im-
proves the models. The two factor model has a better fit, and there is a correlation of
0.82 between both factors, which is still high, but substantially lower than the 0.90
reported in the general population. The data clearly favour the most complex model,
Table 2 Fit statistics for CFA of 15 item CASP scale
RMSEA CFI TLI
One factor (quality of life) 0.097 0.940 0.929
With error correlations 0.091 0.947 0.938
Two factors (pleasure/control, autonomy & self-actualisation) 0.088 0.950 0.941
With error correlations 0.082 0.957 0.949
Three factors (pleasure/control & autonomy/self-actualisation) 0.078 0.962 0.955
With error correlations 0.074 0.966 0.959
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with two factors and error correlations between the negatively worded items, reflecting
the salience of the division between somatic and mood aspects of depression in an older
population.
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ)
The GHQ is a 12 item scale, intended as a general screening instrument for psychiatric
morbidity (Goldberg and Williams 1988). Most researchers examining the factor
structure have focused on the number of sub dimensions. While a large part of the
scientific work has been highlighting the plausibility of a three factor structure (anxiety,
social dysfunction and loss of confidence) instead of the original one factor (Graetz
1991; Shevlin and Adamson 2005), recently the inclusion of method effects of negative
wording has shown this multidimensionality to be a measurement artefact (Hankins
2008). An alternative specification distinguishes positive from negative items in a two
dimensional model (Graetz 1991).
Our test on a representative sample of community dwelling people aged 50 or older
seems to confirm these findings, showing a relatively robust one factor solution, if we
adjust for negative item wording (see Table 4). Since there is a significant difference in
fit between the specifications with error correlations and the method factor, allowing
the error correlations might be masking substantial aspects of the scale. Therefore the
three dimensional model is preferred to allow a finegrained conceptual analysis.
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS)
The satisfaction with life scale (Diener et al. 1985) is commonly seen as a one
dimensional scale for global life satisfaction, comprising five items (Pavot and
Diener 1993), but sometimes a single item is used (Morrison et al. 2011). A two factor
structure, with one factor referring to the past and another to the present, has equally
Table 3 Fit statistics for CFA of 8
item CES-D scale
RMSEA CFI TLI
1 factor (depressive symptoms) 0.077 0.971 0.960
With error correlations 0.065 0.981 0.971
2 factors (somatic/mood symptoms) 0.053 0.987 0.981
With error correlations 0.035 0.995 0.992
Table 4 Fit statistics for CFA of 12 item GHQ scale
RMSEA CFI TLI
1 factor (mental health) 0.148 0.913 0.893
With error correlations 0.080 0.982 0.969
With method factor 0.092 0.970 0.959
2 factors (positive/negative items of mental health) 0.094 0.965 0.957
3 factors (anxiety/social dysfunction/loss of confidence) 0.085 0.973 0.965
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been reported for older respondents, and in different cultures than the US (Hultell and
Petter Gustavsson 2008; Oishi 2006; Pons et al. 2000). These two factors are very
closely related in most studies (correlation around 0.90). Since all items are worded in
the same sense, a method factor is not necessary.
Both the one factor and two factor model do not seem to fit very well according to
the RMSEA, but have a very good fit according to the CFI (Table 5). The two factor
model seems marginally better, but the correlation between both factors is very high
(0.938). It is a quite surprising finding that a common instrument to measure subjective
well-being does not seem to suit particularly well for older respondents in England.
Modification indices indicate that being satisfied with life (item c) is more closely
related to evaluating one’s life as ideal (item a), and less to perceiving one’s life
conditions as ideal. We allow this correlation, and keep in mind that conditions seem
to be less important for life satisfaction among the elderly in the UK.
Well-Being Measures Combined: A Second Order Measure of Well-Being
Having an indication on the structure of separate aspects of well-being, allows to
investigate to what extent these different aspects coincide. As each scale allows a
different set of answering categories, putting everything in one analysis can only yield
limited results. The CES-D items are binary in nature, while both CASP and GHQ
provide 5 response categories and the SWLS 7. Although the CASP and GHQ items
have the same number of answering possibilities, their meaning differs as in CASP the
frequency of something happening is asked for, while in GHQ the respondent is asked
to compare the something with their ‘usual’ behaviour. This means that the highest
correlations between sub-dimensions will logically occur within the same scale. Second
order factor analysis, or constructing latent factors out of factors, makes it possible to
investigate these interrelations.
As a starting point for the second order analysis, the correlations between the
different aspects of well-being, seen here as 10 first order factors, is presented in
Table 6. Correlations lower than 0.60 are considered weak, while correlations higher
than 0.75 are considered strong. As expected, the highest correlations can be observed
between subscales derived from a similar instrument. More relevant for the topic of this
paper, is that a number of concepts only are weakly related to each other. Satisfaction
with life in general can be seen as only weakly related to most aspects of mental health,
which is indicated by the moderate correlations with most subscales of the GHQ and
CES-D. On the other hand satisfaction with life, especially in the present, is strongly
related to self-actualisation. Anxiety is closely related to symptoms of a depressive
mood, but less to self-actualisation and pleasure. Loss of confidence seems closely
associated with low control and autonomy. Somatic symptoms of depression are
especially weakly related to satisfaction with past life, and only moderately with
Table 5 Fit statistics for CFA of 5
item SWLS scale
RMSEA CFI TLI
1 factor (life satisfaction) 0.159 0.994 0.987
2 factor (past/present life satisfaction) 0.144 0.996 0.990
With error correlation between a and c 0.131 0.997 0.991
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satisfaction with life in the present, or pleasure. In general depressed mood is slightly
closer related to satisfaction with life and general mental health compared to somatic
symptoms.
In a next step a number of theoretically grounded second order factor models
(Table 7) are tested. This allows drawing conclusions on the most adequate conceptual
model to represent subjective well-being in later life. Is well-being in later life best
captured by a single second order factor, where all sub-dimensions refer to the same
latent concept, as in model 1? Or is a split between eudemonic and hedonic well-being
(model 2) more accommodating for our data? A second two dimensional structure































0.593 0.521 0.857 0.748
CES-D
somatic
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0.730 0.641 0.666 0.589 0.717 −0.640 −0.656
CASP self-
realisation
0.779 0.753 0.546 0.617 0.607 −0.667 −0.639 −0.847
CASP
pleasure
0.710 0.732 0.582 0.566 0.648 −0.512 −0.646 −0.790 0.886
Table 7 Overview of second order structures
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could also be distilled from the literature, in the sense that eudemonia is a part of
hedonic cognitive well-being (model 3). A three factor latent structure, which distin-
guishes a hedonic affective, hedonic cognitive and eudemonic component of well-
being, could be seen as a compromise between hedonic and eudemonic conceptions of
well-being (model 4).
An overview of the model fit of these different second order models is given in
Table 8. Factor loadings on the second order factor(s) are consistently high, so they are
not mentioned. Specifying a single second order factor (Model 1) means reducing all
these aspects of well-being to a single dimension. Although this model has a reasonable
fit in terms of RMSEA, this seems less the case for the other fit indices. This means that
using a single well-being concept is defendable, but does not fully grasp the complexity
of the subject at hand. Adopting the dominant view by separating hedonic from
eudemonic well-being (Model 2), does not seem to greatly improve the understanding
of the data. The division between hedonic and eudemonic measures seems less
substantial than expected, with a correlation of 0.86 between both dimensions.
Distinguishing affective from cognitive aspects of well-being (Model 3) on the other
hand has a substantial impact, as this model approaches very good fit. The compromise
between both two dimensional approaches (Model 4), specifying a dimension of
hedonic cognitive, hedonic affective and eudemonic well-being, fits our data very well.
The correlations between these higher order measures of well-being give further
evidence to the benefit of the three factor solution (Model 4): cognitive aspects of
subjective well-being are more closely related to eudemonic (r=0.85) than to affective
aspects of well-being (r=0.69).
Conclusions
This paper investigates the empirical measurement of well-being in later life, by
examining a number of commonly used scales and looking at their interrelations.
This is important in the context of psycho-social aspects of successful ageing, as in
contrast to more biological aspects of health, the assessment of subjective well-being is
less structured and standardised. Two approaches to well-being are examined: the
dominant approach, hedonic well-being, assumes that well-being emanates from plea-
sure and the avoidance of painful experiences, however these are defined by the
individual. Measuring well-being in this framework tries to capture moods and emo-
tions on one hand, in the form of positive and negative affect, and cognitive evaluations
of one’s life on the other hand (Diener 1984). A second and more recent approach to
well-being, eudemonic well-being, is less unified and consists of several
Table 8 Fit statistics for second
order CFA
RMSEA CFI TLI
Model 1 0.080 0.902 0.895
Model 2 0.075 0.913 0.907
Model 3 0.062 0.940 0.936
Model 4 0.057 0.951 0.947
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multidimensional approaches (Hyde et al. 2003; Ryan and Deci 2000; Ryff and Keyes
1995). What they have in common is that they assume well-being emerges as a result of
the satisfaction of universal human psychological needs, such as autonomy, self-
actualisation and control.
To what extent do indicators of these different aspects of well-being, commonly
developed by testing on either relatively small groups of students or in population wide
large scale surveys, replicate their structure among adults aged 50 or older in England?
Both instruments aimed at capturing negative affect, CES-D and GHQ, performed most
in line with their expectations. While considering CES-D as a one dimensional
instrument screening for depression is acceptable, a more fine grained approach to
depression clearly distinguishes somatic aspects from emotional ones. The GHQ
measure in a similar vein is acceptable as a one dimensional construct, but allows
more nuance when looking at anxiety, social and confidence aspects of mental health
separately. Satisfaction with life, the most commonly used measure for well-being,
seems to perform relatively poorly. The CASP scale was used in a revised 15 item
version, and a balanced three dimensional structure, consisting of control and autono-
my, self-realisation and pleasure, was found to be most accurate to measure eudemonic
aspects of well-being.
In regard to the nature of well-being, it seems that the difference between hedonic
and eudemonic well-being has been exaggerated in the literature. If a multidimensional
concept of well-being is adopted, a threefold structure, distinguishing cognitive, affec-
tive and eudemonic well-being is most informative. Rather than illustrating a divide
between feelings of satisfaction and striving for self-development, self-reported
measures of well-being show a strong relationship between both. People who
are satisfied in later life tend to feel autonomous, in control and pursue
development. Less strong, but still very present, is the relation between satis-
faction and flourishing on one hand, and the absence of negative mood on the
other. This merits some attention, as satisfaction is often equated with happiness
and good mental health. As such, our findings illustrate that Diener (1984) was
right in separating moods from evaluations and judgements about life.
Eudemonic aspects can hence be seen as a more qualitative aspect of wellbeing,
outlining why people are satisfied.
What would help us answer the questions posed in this analysis better, or in other
words what are the suggestions for further research and limitations of this study? First
of all, access and inclusion to more measures of well-being could broaden our
understanding. Our analysis was, from onset on, limited by the available measures,
which were not devised to be used in the framework of an overarching theory of well-
being, and hence used different response categories. As such a larger and more
complete set of subjective measures of well-being in old age, with more similarity in
terms of response categories could strengthen our findings. Secondly, the real utility of
a multidimensional approach lays in its application to substantial research question,
such as for example the successful ageing framework. A last suggestion in a similar
vein is to strengthen the theoretical work on how eudemonic, affective and cognitive
well-being are interrelated. While up until now most research efforts pursuing either
hedonic and eudemonic aspects of well-being are rather partisan in nature, and try to
contrast and compare the relative merits of each approach, the real way forward lies in
capitalising on the inherent value of both approaches.
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Appendix
SWLS (Diener 1984)
a. In most ways my life is close to ideal (n=8077)
b. The conditions of my life are excellent (n=8044)
c. I am satisfied with my life (n=8120)
d. So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life (n=8122)










Now think about the past week and the feelings you have experienced.
Please tell me if each of the following was true for you much of the time during the
past week.
(Much of the time during past week),
a. You felt depressed? (n=8222)
b. You felt that everything you did was an effort? (n=8221)
c. Your sleep was restless? (n=8223)
d. You were happy? (n=8207)
e. You felt lonely? (n=8222)
f. You enjoyed life? (n=8210)
g. You felt sad? (n=8217)





We should like to know how your health has been in general over the past few weeks.
Have you recently…
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a. been able to concentrate on whatever you’re doing? (n=8163)
b. lost much sleep over worry? (n=8155)
c. felt you were playing a useful part in things? (n=8082)
d. felt capable of making decisions? (n=8160)
e. felt constantly under strain? (n=8141)
f. felt you couldn’t overcome your difficulties? (n=8131)
g. been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? (n=8155)
h. been able to face up to your problems? (n=8154)
i. been feeling unhappy and depressed? (n=8153)
j. been losing confidence in yourself? (n=8157)
k. been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? (n=8153)
l. been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered? (n=8149)
Answering categories
1 Better than usual
2 Same as usual
3 Less than usual
4 Much less than usual
Quality of Life (CASP) (Hyde et al. 2003)
Here is a list of statements that people have used to describe their lives or how they feel.
We would like to know how often, if at all, you think they apply to you.
Control
a. My age prevents me from doing the things I would like to. (n=8143)
b. I feel that what happens to me is out of control. (n=8088)
c. I feel free to plan things for the future. (n=8063)
d. I feel left out of things. (n=8096)
Autonomy
e. I can do the things that I want to do. (n=8110)
f. Family responsibilities prevent me from doing what I want to do. (n=8076)
g. I feel that I can please myself what I can do. (n=8107)
h. My health stops me from doing the things I want to do. (n=8140)
i. Shortage of money stops me from doing the things I want to do. (n=8129)
Pleasure
j. I look forward to each day. (n=8125)
k. I feel that my life has meaning. (n=8094)
l. I enjoy the things that I do. (n=8130)
m. I enjoy being in the company of others. (n=8148)
n. On balance, I look back on my life with a sense of happiness. (n=8117)
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Self-realization
& I feel full of energy these days. (n=8121)
& I choose to do things that I have never done before. (n=8095)
& I feel satisfied with the way my life has turned out. (n=8104)
& I feel that life is full of opportunities. (n=8089)







Alexopoulos, G. S. (2005). Depression in the elderly. Lancet, 365(9475), 1961–1970.
Ariely, G., & Davidov, E. (2011). Assessment of measurement equivalence with cross-national and longitu-
dinal surveys in political science. European Political Science, 1, 1–15.
Beaumont, J. (2011). Measuring National Well-being - Discussion paper on domains and measures. London.
Beekman, A. T., & Deeg, D. (1995). Major and minor depression in later life: a study of prevalence and risk
factors. Journal of Affective Di, 36, 65–75. doi:10.1111/j.1752-0606.2011.00243.x.
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables (p. 514). Wiley.
Bowling, A., & Dieppe, P. (2005). What is successful ageing and who should define it? BMJ: British Medical
Journal, 331, 1548–1551. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmc1322264/.
Bradburn, N. M. (1969). The structure of psychological well-being. Chicago: Aldine.
Brown, T. A. (2003). Confirmatory factor analysis of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire: multiple factors or
method effects? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(12), 1411–1426. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00059-7.
Brown, T. A. (2006). Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research. New York: The Guilford Press.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., & Rodgers, W. L. (1976). The quality of American life: Perceptions,
evaluations, and satisfactions (p. 583). New York: Russell Sage.
Chen, Y., Rendina-gobioff, G., & Dedrick, R. F. (2010). Factorial invariance of a Chinese self-esteem scale for
third and sixth grade students: evaluating method effects associated with positively and negatively worded
items. International Journal of Educational and Psychological Assessment, 6, 21–35.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Hedonia, eudaimonia, and well-being: an introduction. Journal of
Happiness Studies, 9(1), 1–11. doi:10.1007/s10902-006-9018-1.
Delle Fave, A., Brdar, I., Freire, T., Vella-Brodrick, D., & Wissing, M. P. (2010). The eudaimonic and hedonic
components of happiness: qualitative and quantitative findings. Social Indicators Research, 100(2), 185–
207. doi:10.1007/s11205-010-9632-5.
Demakakos, P., McMunn, A., & Steptoe, A. (2010). Well-being in older age: A multidimensional perspective.
In J. Banks, C. Lessof, J. Nazroo, N. Rogers, M. Stafford, & A. Steptoe (Eds.), Financial circumstances,
health and well-being of the older population in England. The 2008 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(pp. 115–177). London: Institute for fiscal studies.
Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 542–575. Retrieved from http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21228133.
Diener, E., Emmons, R., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). Satisfaction with life scale. Journal of Personality
Assessment, 49(1), 71–75.
Diener, E., Sapyta, J. J., & Suh, E. (1998). Subjective well-being is essential to well-being. Psychological
Inquiry, 9(1), 33–37.
Diener, E., Suh, E., & Lucas, R. E. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress. Psychological
bulletin, 125(2), 276–302. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/bul/125/2/276/.
18 B. Vanhoutte
DiStefano, C., & Motl, R. W. (2009). Self-esteem and method effects associated with negatively worded
items: investigating factorial invariance by sex. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary
Journal, 16(1), 134–146. doi:10.1080/10705510802565403.
Easterlin, R. (1974). Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence. In P. A. David
& M. W. Reder (Eds.), Nations and households in economic growth: Essays in honor of Moses
Abramovitz (pp. 87–125). New York: Academic.
Giddens, A. (1991).Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Stanford University
Press.
Goldberg, D. P. (1988). A User’s Guide to the GHQ. Windsor.
Goldberg, D. P., & Williams, P. (1988). A user’s guide to the General Health Questionnaire. Basingstoke.
Graetz, B. (1991). Multidimensional properties of the General Health Questionnaire. Social Psychiatry and
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 26(3), 132–138.
Hankins, M. (2008). The reliability of the twelve-item general health questionnaire (GHQ-12) under realistic
assumptions. BMC Public Health, 8, 355. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-8-355.
Henderson, L. W., & Knight, T. (2012). Integrating the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives to more
comprehensively understand wellbeing and pathways to wellbeing. Internation Journal of Wellbeing,
2(3), 196–221. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i3.3.
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: conventional
criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A, 6(1), 1–55.
Hultell, D., & Petter Gustavsson, J. (2008). A psychometric evaluation of the satisfaction with life scale in a
Swedish nationwide sample of university students. Personality and Individual Differences, 44(5), 1070–
1079. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.10.030.
Hyde, M., Wiggins, R. D., Higgs, P., & Blane, D. (2003). A measure of quality of life in early old age: the
theory, development and properties of a needs satisfaction model (CASP-19). Aging & Mental Health,
7(3), 186–194. doi:10.1080/1360786031000101157.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43
societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kahneman, D., Krueger, A. B., Schkade, D. A., Schwarz, N., & Stone, A. a. (2006). Would you be happier if
you were richer? A focusing illusion. Science (New York, N.Y.), 312(5782), 1908–10. doi:10.1126/
science.1129688.
Kahneman, D., & Thaler, R. H. (2006). Utility maximization and experienced utility. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 20(1), 221–234.
Kashdan, T. B., Biswas-Diener, R., & King, L. a. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: the costs of distinguishing
between hedonics and eudaimonia. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(4), 219–233. doi:10.1080/
17439760802303044.
King, D. A., & Markus, H. E. (2000). Mood disorders in older adults. In S. K. Whitbourne (Ed.),
Psychopathology in later adulthood (pp. 141–172). New York: Wiley.
Kohout, F. J., Berkman, L. F., Evans, D. a., & Cornoni-Huntley, J. (1993). Two shorter forms of the CES-D
depression symptoms index. Journal of Aging and Health, 5(2), 179–193. doi:10.1177/
089826439300500202.
Lebowitz, B. D., Pearson, J. L., Schneider, L. S., Reynolds, C. F., Alexopoulos, G. S., Bruce, M. L., &
Parmelee, P. A. (1997). Diagnosis and treatment of depression in late life consensus statement update. In
Jama The Journal Of The American Medical Association, 278, 1186–1190.
Marmot, M., Banks, J., Blundell, R., Erens, B., Lessof, C., Nazroo, J., & Huppert, F. A. (2011). English
longitudinal study of ageing: Wave 0 (1998, 1999 and 2001) and Waves 1-4 (2002-2009). Colchester: UK
Data Archive.
Marsh, H. W. (1996). Positive and negative global self-esteem: a substantively meaningful distinction or
artifactors? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4), 810–819.
Maslow, A. (1968). Towards a psychology of being. New York: Van Nostrand.
Meredith, W. (1993). Measurement invariance, factor analysis and factorial invariance. Psychometrika, 58(4),
525–543.
Morrison, M., Tay, L., & Diener, E. (2011). Subjective well-being and national satisfaction: findings from a
worldwide survey. Psychological Science, 22(2), 166–171. doi:10.1177/0956797610396224.
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2010). Mplus user’s guide (6th ed.). Los Angeles: Muthen & Muthen.
OECD. (2011). How’s life? Measuring Well-being (p. 286). OECD Publishing.
Oishi, S. (2006). The concept of life satisfaction across cultures: An IRT analysis. Journal of Research in
Personality, 40(4), 411–423. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.02.002.
Pavot, W., & Diener, E. (1993). Review of the satisfaction with life scale. Psychological Assessment, 5(2),
164.
The Multidimensional Structure of Subjective Well-Being 19
Pons, D., Atienza, F. L., Balaguer, I., & García-Merita, M. L. (2000). Satisfaction with life scale: analysis of
factorial invariance for adolescents and elderly persons. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 91(1), 62–68.
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: a self-report depression scale for research in the general population.
Applied Psychological Measurement, 1(3), 285–401.
Ross, C. E., & Mirowsky, J. (1984). Components of depressed mood in married men and women. American
Journal of Epidemiology, 119(6), 997–1004.
Rowe, J. W., & Kahn, R. L. (1997). Successful ageing. The Gerontologist, 37(4), 433–440.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social
development, and well-being. The American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: a review of research on hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 52(1), 141–166.
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Beyond Ponce de Leon and life satisfaction: new directions in quest of successful ageing.
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 12(1), 35–55. doi:10.1177/016502548901200102.
Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69(4), 719.
Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. H. (1998). The contours of positive human health. Psychological Inquiry, 9(1), 1–28.
Ryff, C. D., Singer, B. H., & Dienberg Love, G. (2004). Positive health: connecting well-being with biology.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, 359(1449),
1383–1394. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1521.
Scholes, S., Medina, J., Cheshire, H., & Cox, K. (2009). Living in the 21st Century: Older People in England.
The 2006 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, (5050).
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: an introduction. American
Psychologist, 55(1), 5.
Sexton, E., King-Kallimanis, B. L., Conroy, R. M., & Hickey, A. (2013). Psychometric evaluation of the
CASP-19 quality of life scale in an older Irish cohort. Quality of Life Research: An International Journal
of Quality of Life Aspects of Treatment, Care and Rehabilitation. doi:10.1007/s11136-013-0388-7.
Shevlin, M., & Adamson, G. (2005). Alternative factor models and factorial invariance of the GHQ-12: a large
sample analysis using confirmatory factor analysis. Psychological Assessment, 17(2), 231–236. doi:10.
1037/1040-3590.17.2.231.
Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J. (2009). Report by the commission on the measurement of economic
performance and social progress. Performance and Social Progress (p. 291).
Strawbridge, W. J., Wallhagen, M. I., & Cohen, R. D. (2002). Successful aging and well-being: self-rated
compared with Rowe and Kahn. The Gerontologist, 42(6), 727–733.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental
health. Psychological Bulletin, 103(2), 193–210.
Van de Velde, S., Bracke, P., Levecque, K., & Meuleman, B. (2010). Gender differences in depression in 25
European countries after eliminating measurement bias in the CES-D 8. Social Science Research, 39(3),
396–404. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.01.002.
Van den Berg, M. D., Oldehinkel, a. J., Bouhuys, a. L., Brilman, E. I., Beekman, A. T., & Ormel, J. (2001).
Depression in later life: three etiologically different subgroups. Journal of Affective Disorders, 65(1), 19–26.
Vanhoutte, B. (2012). Measuring subjective well-being in later life: A review. Manchester.
Wallace, R. B., Herzog, A. R., Ofstedal, M. B., Steffick, D., Fonda, S., & Langa, K. M. (2000).
Documentation of affective functioning measures in the health and retirement study. Ann Arbor: MI.
Waterman, A. S. (1993). Two conceptions of happiness: contrasts of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia)
and hedonic enjoyment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(4), 678–691.
Waterman, A. S. (2007). On the importance of distinguishing hedonia and eudaimonia when contemplating
the hedonic treadmill. The American Psychologist, 62(6), 612–613. doi:10.1037/0003-066X62.6.612.
Waterman, A. S. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: a eudaimonist’s perspective. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 3(4), 234–252. doi:10.1080/17439760802303002.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and
negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063–1070.
Wiggins, R. D., Netuveli, G., Hyde, M., Higgs, P., & Blane, D. (2008). The evaluation of a self-enumerated
scale of quality of life (CASP-19) in the context of research on ageing: a combination of exploratory and
confirmatory approaches. Social Indicators Research, 89(1), 61–77. doi:10.1007/s11205-007-9220-5.
Wood, A. M., Taylor, P. J., & Joseph, S. (2010). Does the CES-D measure a continuum from depression to
happiness? Comparing substantive and artifactual models. Psychiatry Research, 177(1–2), 120–123.
doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2010.02.003.
20 B. Vanhoutte
